GPS jamming and GNSS interference map
Aircraft broadcast how good they believe their own position is. When that confidence collapses across many aircraft in the same place, something is interfering with GNSS reception. This map counts exactly that, and nothing more.
How the number in each hexagon is produced
Every ADS-B position carries two self-reported quality fields. NIC states the containment radius the aircraft claims its position falls within. NACp states the 95 percent accuracy of that position. A correctly working transponder lowers both when its GNSS receiver struggles, so a sudden collapse across many unrelated aircraft in one area is the visible fingerprint of interference. See NIC and NACp explained for the full value scale.
An aircraft counts as degraded when NIC is below 7 or NACp is below 8. Each hexagon is an H3 resolution 4 cell, roughly 22 km across. Aircraft are counted once per cell per hour, and a cell is only drawn once at least 8 distinct aircraft have crossed it, so a single unusual aircraft cannot color the map.
What is deliberately excluded
- ADS-B version 0 transmitters, which report these fields as zero by design
- Positions that are not the aircraft's own broadcast: multilateration, TIS-B and ADS-R
- Gliders, ultralights and UAVs, whose converters frequently have no GNSS source at all
- Installations reporting SIL 0, meaning an uncertified or unknown position source. In live data these were nearly every false positive we saw, light aircraft reporting zeros in clear skies
What this map cannot tell you
- It does not detect a jammer. It measures the effect on receivers, not the transmitter. Nothing here locates or attributes a source.
- Degradation has innocent causes. Older avionics, satellite geometry and multipath near terrain all lower these fields.
- Empty is not clear. Blank areas mean no observations. Coverage follows volunteer ADS-B receivers, and AeroScope fetches the areas its own visitors are viewing, so large parts of the world are simply unobserved here.
- Spoofing is a different problem. A convincing spoof can keep these fields high while reporting a false position. See spoofing detection for the checks that target that case.
This is the same honest framing used on the limitations page, and it applies here too: a surveillance signal whose limits you do not know is worse than one whose limits you do.
Common questions
Is this the same as gpsjam.org?
How often does it update?
Can I get this as data?
/api/overlays/gnss?hours=24, which returns each cell with its counts and boundary. See the API docs.